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In recent years, several authors have called to ground descriptive and normative decision 
theory on neuro-psychological measures of utility. In this paper, I combine insights from 
the best available neuro-psychological findings, leading philosophical conceptions of 
welfare and contemporary decision theory to rebut these prominent calls. I argue for two 
claims of general interest to philosophers, choice modellers and policy makers. First, 
severe conceptual, epistemic and evidential problems plague ongoing attempts to develop 
accurate and reliable neuro-psychological measures of utility. And second, even if these 
problems are solved, neuro-psychological measures of utility lack the potential to inform 
welfare analyses and policy evaluations. 
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Over the last two decades, neuro-psychological findings have enabled choice modellers 
to make significant advances in predicting and explaining individuals’ choices (e.g. 
Camerer, 2008). Building on these advances, several authors have called to ground 
decision theory on neuro-psychological measures of utility (e.g. Dolan and Kahneman, 
2008, Glimcher, 2010). The idea is that while standard decision theory takes rational 
agents to behave as if they maximize expected utility, recent neuro-psychological findings 
demonstrate that utility is literally computed by individuals’ brains and can be measured 
in psycho-physical terms (e.g. Kable and Glimcher, 2009, Kahneman et al., 1997). These 
findings, in turn, are claimed to prompt revolutionary changes in both descriptive and 
normative decision theory. Descriptively, they allegedly provide “a neurobiological 
foundation for standard [decision] theory and a tool for measuring preferences 
neurobiologically” (Levy and Glimcher, 2012, 1027). Normatively, they purportedly 
undermine decision theory’s “tight connection between choice and welfare” and enable 
researchers to identify “true utility, which encapsulates well-being” (Bernheim and 
Rangel, 2009, 51). 
 
Calls to ground decision theory on neuro-psychological measures of utility have gained 
increasing popularity among choice modellers (e.g. Dolan and White, 2007), and support 
dissimilar evaluations of policies’ welfare implications than standard decision theory (e.g. 
Angner, 2011, Hausman, 2010). In this paper, I combine insights from the best available 
neuro-psychological findings, leading philosophical conceptions of welfare and 
contemporary decision theory to rebut such prominent calls. I argue for two claims of 
general interest to philosophers, choice modellers and policy makers. First, severe 
conceptual, epistemic and evidential problems plague ongoing attempts to develop 
accurate and reliable neuro-psychological measures of utility. And second, even if these 
problems are solved, neuro-psychological measures of utility lack the potential to inform 
welfare analyses and policy evaluations. My point is not merely that different authors 
speak of ‘true utility’ in dissimilar senses or that current neuro-psychological measures 
are insufficiently developed. Rather, my thesis is that the search for true utility rests on 
ill-founded empirical and methodological presuppositions and that researchers should 
abandon this search altogether.1 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contrasts the notion of decision utility that 
figures prominently in standard decision theory and the notions of true utility put forward 
in the recent neuro-psychological literature. Section 3 examines the issue whether the 
available neuro-psychological findings enable researchers to develop accurate and 
reliable neuro-psychological measures of utility. Section 4 critically assesses the potential 
of neuro-psychological measures of utility to inform welfare analyses and policy 
evaluations. In doing so, it identifies and rebuts various objections that the proponents of 
true utility may put forward to vindicate their reliance on neuro-psychological measures. 
 
 
                                                          
1 I speak of ‘neuro-psychology’ broadly to encompass several studies targeting individuals’ 
hedonic experiences and the activation patterns of specific neural areas. Also, I use the expression 
‘inform welfare analyses and policy evaluations’ to indicate the thesis that neuro-psychological 
measures of utility have direct descriptive and normative relevance for welfare analyses and 
policy evaluations. 
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2. Decision Utility versus True Utility 
 
 
The notion of decision utility (henceforth, DU) refers to a mathematical representation of 
agents’ preferences over choice options to be inferred from agents’ choices between such 
options (e.g. Broome, 1991). DU figures prominently in the representation theorems at 
the core of standard decision theory (e.g. Savage, 1954). The idea is that if an agent’s 
preferences satisfy specific axiomatic requirements (e.g. completeness, transitivity, 
independence), then the agent necessarily behaves as if she maximizes expected utility, 
i.e. of any two options, the one preferred is assigned higher expected utility. In this 
context, DU is regarded as derivative from choices and is ascribed no sensory or 
psychological properties (e.g. XXX, Okasha, 2016). That is to say, “when [the relevant] 
axioms are obeyed […] utility is not ‘a feeling’, or ‘happiness’, or ‘a hedonic impulse’ 
[but is just a mathematical index of] ‘choice’” (Glimcher, 2009, 505). 
 
The notion of true utility (henceforth, TU) refers to a measurable psycho-physical 
magnitude rather than a mathematical construct such as DU. In the recent neuro-
psychological literature, various notions of TU have been proposed. The notions of 
experienced utility and neural utility are especially influential in this context. These two 
notions relate utility to empirical facts about individuals’ neuro-psychology rather than to 
a mathematical index of individuals’ choices. More specifically, the notion of 
experienced utility (henceforth, EU) refers to a psycho-physical magnitude that putatively 
reflects individuals’ hedonic experiences and causally influences individuals’ choices 
(e.g. Kahneman, 2000). EU figures prominently both in psychological studies of 
individuals’ hedonic experiences and in some philosophers’ interpretations of decision 
theory (e.g. Dietrich and List, 2016). In fact, EU is often claimed to resemble early 
utilitarian philosophers’ notion of utility (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1997, on Bentham). The 
notion of neural utility (henceforth, NU) refers to the activation patterns of specific neural 
areas and the rewards’ subjective values allegedly computed and integrated by such areas 
(e.g. Glimcher, 2010). NU figures prominently in the specialized neuro-psychological 
and neuroeconomic literature. In this literature, there is growing consensus that 
activations in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex/orbitofrontal cortex (henceforth, 
vmPFC/OFC) track rewards’ subjective values across multiple reward types (e.g. Levy 
and Glimcher, 2012). The idea is that these subjective values “are exactly the kind of 
value representation posited by most decision theories […] analogous to what economists 
call ‘utilities’” (Kable and Glimcher, 2009, 734). 
 
 
3. True Utility: Descriptive Evaluation 
 
 
In this section, I examine the issue whether the available neuro-psychological findings 
enable researchers to develop accurate and reliable neuro-psychological measures of 
utility. I argue that ongoing attempts to develop such measures face at least four major 
challenges: the challenge from measurement divergences, the challenge from 
indeterminate referents, the challenge from unclear unit of measurement, and the 
challenge from conceptual barriers. Some of these challenges (e.g. measurement 
divergences) affect also DU measures. Other challenges, instead, specifically target TU 
(rather than DU) measures, and license selective scepticism regarding TU measures.  
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3.1 The challenge from measurement divergences builds on the profound divergences 
between measurements that purportedly target the same notions of TU to question leading 
authors’ aim to identify “a single, unifying concept that motivates all human choices and 
registers all relevant feelings and experiences” (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006, 4). This 
challenge targets both EU and NU measurements. 
 
EU measurements can vary dramatically depending on what methods one uses to measure 
EU (e.g. XXX on divergences between physiological indices and individuals’ reports of 
their own hedonic experiences). Moreover, significant divergences arise for the same 
methods depending on whether one focuses on instant utility measures, which target 
momentary evaluations of ongoing hedonic experiences, remembered utility measures, 
which target retrospective evaluations of past hedonic experiences, or anticipated utility 
measures, which target predictions concerning future hedonic experiences (e.g. Dolan and 
Kahneman, 2008, on individuals’ failures to reliably predict their own future EU). These 
divergences arise not just from putative limitations of current measurement methods, but 
also from specific properties of the notions of TU supposedly targeted by neuro-
psychological measures. For instance, the act of remembering past experiences typically 
involves active reconstruction (rather than passive recall) of these experiences. As a 
result, remembered utility measurements frequently fail to accurately reflect how pleasant 
past events were while being experienced (e.g. Kahneman, 2000, on so-called duration 
neglect). These concerns exacerbate when one considers that EU measurements can vary 
remarkably because of factors that are not directly related to the valence/phenomenal 
qualities of individuals’ hedonic experiences (e.g. Fleurbaey, 2009, on temporary weather 
conditions). 
 
Regarding NU, at least four features of the human neural architecture can generate 
significant divergences between different NU measurements: (1) rewards’ subjective 
values depend not only on rewards’ objective attributes, but also on interpersonally and 
intertemporally variable reference points, and different measures diverge as to how these 
reference points are affected by individuals’ available, anticipated and recently obtained 
rewards (e.g. Glimcher, 2010); (2) to encode a potentially infinite range of reward values 
in a finite range of activations, the neural substrates of reward valuation do not represent 
rewards’ absolute values, but rely on normalization processes that hinder the suitability 
of observed neural activations to serve as reliable proxies for rewards’ subjective values 
across individuals and measurement contexts (e.g. Louie et al., 2013); (3) the neural 
substrates of reward valuation routinely remove subsets of incoming information streams 
(e.g. regularity-induced redundancies) to maximize the efficiency of information coding, 
thereby increasing neural activations’ independence from the available rewards and 
stimuli (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa, 2011); (4) the brain does not invariably evaluate the impact 
of all factors that causally influence individuals’ choices in terms of a direct computation 
of rewards’ subjective values (e.g. Ross, 2008), so “there are many behaviors that can be 
described as a decision but are not [based on rewards’] subjective values” (Padoa-
Schioppa and Schoenbaum, 2015, 17). 
 
3.2 Challenge from indeterminate referents. The proponents of TU often leave it 
indeterminate whether TU tracks only individuals’ psycho-physical feelings (hedonic 
interpretations of TU) or also their cognitive/evaluative attitudes regarding such feelings 
(attitudinal interpretations of TU). In fact, even the same authors frequently fail to specify 
which of these interpretations of TU they adopt (e.g. Angner, 2011, on Kahneman, 2000). 
This lack of specificity complicates attempts to provide accurate and reliable neuro-
psychological measures of utility in at least three respects. First, neuro-psychological 
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measurements significantly vary depending on whether one adopts hedonic or attitudinal 
interpretations of TU (e.g. Crisp, 2006, on hedonic and attitudinal EU; Berridge and 
O’Doherty, 2014, on hedonic and attitudinal NU). Second, authors who agree on whether 
to adopt hedonic (or attitudinal) interpretations of TU frequently disagree regarding what 
set of feelings (or attitudes) are tracked by TU (e.g. Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008). And 
third, attempts to determine the referents of TU pose the following dilemma to the 
proponents of TU. On the one hand, hedonic interpretations of TU fail to track many of 
the referents that researchers associate with TU (e.g. Heathwood, 2006, on physiological 
indices’ failure to accurately track the influence of individuals’ desires on the 
valence/phenomenal qualities of their own hedonic experiences). On the other hand, 
attitudinal interpretations of TU face severe measurability concerns. To illustrate these 
concerns, consider measurements of attitudinal EU. 
 
There are several reasons why measurements of attitudinal EU may fail to accurately 
track the valence/phenomenal qualities of individuals’ hedonic experiences: (1) the 
valence/phenomenal qualities of some hedonic experiences are hard to assess for 
individuals (e.g. Haybron, 2005, on various moods), and individuals’ abilities to assess 
such valence/phenomenal qualities vary across individuals and situations in ways that are 
difficult to monitor (e.g. Fleurbaey, 2009); (2) the scales individuals use to evaluate their 
own hedonic experiences vary across time and situations to a degree that hampers both 
the intrapersonal and the interpersonal comparability of individuals’ evaluations (e.g. 
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008, on individuals’ tendency to normalize hedonic evaluations 
of their own health conditions based on implicit standards of comparison); (3) 
individuals’ tendency to adapt to affects and circumstances can alter their hedonic 
evaluations in ways that elude both their own awareness and physiological indices of EU 
(e.g. Van der Deijl, 2017); (4) social norms and pressures can demonstrably modify 
individuals’ hedonic evaluations in the absence of experimentally measurable variations 
in their hedonic experiences (e.g. Dolan and White, 2007); (5) individuals’ hedonic 
evaluations can be significantly affected by their own expectations concerning how they 
ought (or are likely) to feel in specific circumstances (e.g. Haybron, 2007).  
 
3.3 Challenge from unclear unit of measurement. The proponents of TU frequently 
maintain that neuro-psychological measures of utility enable researchers to “objectively 
compare mental state between individuals” (Glimcher, 2010, 425) and provide 
“policymakers [with] a standard unit of measurement for comparisons of well-being 
across domains” (Dolan and White, 2007, 71). However, it remains unclear what unit of 
measurement is supposed to ground these comparisons. Moreover, attempts to identify 
such unit of measurement face daunting difficulties in case of both EU and NU. 
 
EU is often claimed to track a common quality of pleasantness or desirability allegedly 
shared by individuals’ hedonic experiences (e.g. Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). The 
qualitative differences between distinct hedonic experiences do not exclude the 
possibility that these experiences vary in magnitude along some common scale (e.g. 
Kagan, 1992). Still, the proponents of EU have hitherto failed to specify what this putative 
common scale consists in. In fact, several authors doubt the prospects of identifying a 
common scale for measuring the pleasantness or desirability of individuals’ hedonic 
experiences (e.g. Crisp, 2006). A proponent of EU may respond that even if researchers 
are unable to identify a common scale for measuring the pleasantness or desirability of 
individuals’ hedonic experiences, EU can be taken to track all experiences toward which 
individuals have some positive attitude (e.g. Heathwood, 2006). However, to address the 
challenge from unclear unit of measurement, this response must be supplemented with a 
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clear specification of which positive attitudes are tracked by EU and on what scale these 
attitudes are to be measured. In the absence of this specification, lumping all experiences 
toward which individuals have some positive attitude under the label of EU obscures 
(rather than solves) the measurability problems posed by the diversity (and potential 
incommensurability) of individuals’ hedonic experiences. 
 
As to NU, several authors hold that to enable individuals to choose between complex (e.g. 
multi-attribute) alternatives, individuals’ neural architecture must compute and compare 
rewards’ subjective values on a common neural scale (e.g. Landreth and Bickle, 2008). 
In particular, leading researchers concur that anatomically delimited activations in 
vmPFC/OFC “encode the subjective values of different types of rewards on a neural 
common scale” (Levy and Glimcher, 2012, 1027). There are at least four reasons to doubt 
the proffered identifications of a common neural scale: (1) the neural substrates of reward 
valuation are highly distributed, with several areas besides vmPFC/OFC being involved 
in computing and comparing value-related signals across choice situations (e.g. 
Rushworth et al., 2012); (2) activations in vmPFC/OFC contribute to multiple functions 
(e.g. Hunt et al., 2012), which hinders attempts to establish that such activations encode 
rewards’ subjective values rather than contribute to some other function (e.g. Weiskopf, 
2016); (3) most of the proffered correspondences between individuals’ choices and the 
neural substrates of reward valuation target stimulus-bound choices rather than the non-
stimulus-bound choices individuals face in non-laboratory settings (e.g. Ross, 2011), and 
researchers lack convincing evidence that such correspondences generally hold also for 
non-stimulus-bound choices (e.g. XXX); (4) many correspondences between individuals’ 
choices and the neural substrates of reward valuation target rather coarse 
characterizations of these substrates, and break down when more fine-grained 
characterizations of such substrates are targeted (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa and Schoenbaum, 
2015, on the dissimilar functional roles of distinct sub-regions of OFC). As a result, such 
correspondences are more plausibly regarded as consequences of researchers’ taxonomic 
practice rather than independent empirical evidence of a common neural scale. 
 
3.4 Challenge from conceptual barriers. In the specialized philosophical literature, 
various conceptual differences between DU and EU have been identified (e.g. Okasha, 
2016). Here I identify and explicate three major conceptual differences between DU and 
NU: (1) DU represents ordinal relations between choice options rather than unique 
cardinally comparable magnitudes. For this reason, a neuron cannot be plausibly taken to 
represent the utility of a choice option even if this neuron’s firing rate is linearly 
proportional to the value of such option (e.g. Glimcher, 2009, 506); (2) while DU is a 
mathematical index of individuals’ choices, neural measures of rewards’ subjective 
values are empirically dissociable from choices and can causally influence choices (e.g. 
Ross, 2011); (3) there is ongoing debate as to how many kinds of value-related signals 
are computed in the human neural architecture and how exactly these signals are 
integrated intro overall measures of value (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa, 2011, on action-related 
values and values computed in the space of goods irrespective of sensorimotor 
contingencies; Padoa-Schioppa and Schoenbaum, 2015, on values learned and retrieved 
from memory and values computed at the time of choice). These conceptual differences 
do not prevent researchers from identifying statistically significant correlations between 
individuals’ choices and specific areas’ activation patterns (e.g. Kuorikoski and 
Marchionni, 2016). However, they cast serious doubt on leading authors’ claim that 
rewards’ subjective values “are exactly the kind of value representation posited by most 
decision theories […] analogous to what economists call ‘utilities’” (Kable and Glimcher, 
2009, 734). 
 7 
4. True Utility: Normative Evaluation 
 
 
In this section, I critically assess the potential of neuro-psychological measures of utility 
to inform welfare analyses and policy evaluations. In doing so, I identify and rebut various 
objections that the proponents of TU may put forward to vindicate their reliance on neuro-
psychological measures. Standard decision theory commonly takes individuals to be well 
off to the extent that their actual, informed or ideal preferences are satisfied (e.g. Hausman 
and McPherson, 2009). An individual’s preferences count as satisfied when the state of 
affairs targeted by these preferences obtains. Knowing that one’s preferences are satisfied 
in this sense may give one a feeling of satisfaction. Yet, preference satisfaction does not 
have to involve any feeling of satisfaction, and may even obtain when one is unaware that 
her preferences are satisfied (e.g. Hausman, 2010). For their part, the proponents of TU 
regard welfare as measurable on interpersonally comparable scales and rely on neuro-
psychological measures of utility as the relevant indexes of welfare (e.g. Kahneman and 
Krueger, 2006). The idea is that neuro-psychological measures of utility provide accurate 
and reliable indexes of welfare that enable policy makers to establish “when people […] 
choose what is best for them [and] what good policies follow” (Camerer, 2008, 416; 
Bernheim and Rangel, 2009, 85).2 
 
I already discussed in Section 3 some of the limitations that plague current neuro-
psychological measures of utility. Below I assume, for the sake of argument, that 
researchers are able to overcome these limitations. I then argue that even if such 
limitations are overcome, informing welfare analyses and policy evaluations requires 
researchers to solve at least five major problems: (1) provide plausible and informative 
criteria to identify what welfare-relevant operations (if any) are tracked by neuro-
psychological measures of utility (identification problem); (2) make sure that no welfare-
relevant operations are neglected by these measures (exclusion problem); (3) make sure 
that no welfare-irrelevant operations are tracked by such measures (purification problem); 
(4) determine what weights to ascribe to the welfare-relevant operations purportedly 
tracked by neuro-psychological measures (determination problem); (5) aggregate the 
weighted measures of welfare-relevant operations thus determined into summative 
welfare indexes for the targeted individuals/population subsets (aggregation problem). 
 
Some of these problems affect also DU measures (e.g. Bernheim, 2009). However, the 
proponents of TU have hitherto failed to demonstrate that neuro-psychological measures 
solve such problems better than DU measures (e.g. XXX). Moreover, each of those 
problems poses formidable challenges to the proponents of TU. More specifically: (1) 
solving the identification problem requires researchers to make controversial 
normative/axiological presuppositions concerning the nature and the referents of welfare 
(e.g. is welfare related more closely to EU or NU? Is welfare tracked more reliably by 
momentary, retrospective or anticipated evaluations of individuals’ experiences?); (2) 
solving the exclusion problem is complicated by the fact that even basic welfare-relevant 
operations (e.g. anticipating or reminiscing specific experiences) typically engage several 
neuro-psychological processes besides those targeted by neuro-psychological measures 
of utility (e.g. Muldoon and Bassett, 2016); (3) solving the purification problem is 
                                                          
2 I use ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ interchangeably to indicate what makes a life good for the 
individual living such life (e.g. Griffin, 1986). Also, I speak of ‘conceptions of welfare’ to indicate 
theories that specify both which goods/experiences are welfare-enhancing and what properties 
make such goods/experiences welfare-enhancing (e.g. Kagan, 1992). 
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complicated by the fact that the neuro-psychological processes that purportedly contribute 
to welfare-relevant operations also contribute to several non-welfare-relevant operations 
(e.g. Kable and Levy, 2015); (4) solving the determination problem requires researchers 
to establish what normative/axiological significance should be ascribed to neuro-
psychological measures, which “are explicitly positive in nature” (Glimcher, 2010, 412); 
(5) solving the aggregation problem is complicated by the wide diversity (and potential 
incommensurability) of welfare-relevant goods/experiences (e.g. Hausman, 2012) and by 
the limited interpersonal comparability of neuro-psychological measures (Section 3). 
 
A proponent of TU may grant that problems (1)-(5) challenge attempts to provide 
perfectly accurate and reliable neuro-psychological indexes of welfare. However, she may 
object that neuro-psychological indexes of welfare are sufficiently accurate and reliable 
to evaluate most policies’ welfare implications (e.g. Kahneman, 2000). There are at least 
three reasons to doubt that neuro-psychological indexes of welfare are sufficiently 
accurate and reliable to evaluate most policies’ welfare implications. First, neuro-
psychological indexes track a relatively narrow subset of the goods/experiences that on 
most conceptions of welfare count as welfare-enhancing (e.g. Alexandrova, 2017, on 
achievement, freedom and justice). Second, the goods/experiences that on most 
conceptions of welfare count as welfare-enhancing frequently contribute to welfare 
irrespective of what impact they happen to have on neuro-psychological indexes (e.g. 
Hausman and McPherson, 2009). And third, neuro-psychological indexes track several 
goods/experiences that on most conceptions of welfare do not count as welfare-enhancing 
(e.g. pleasures based on mistaken beliefs) and may even detract from welfare (e.g. 
pleasures derived from immoral activities). 
 
A proponent of TU may object that neuro-psychological indexes provide informative 
insights regarding policies’ welfare implications because they reliably track necessary 
components of welfare (e.g. Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, for statistically significant 
correlations between neuro-psychological indexes and various indicators of health). 
However, it is dubious that neuro-psychological indexes reliably track necessary 
components of welfare (e.g. dopaminergic activations targeted by such indexes can be 
induced by addictive substances that demonstrably hamper individuals’ welfare). 
Moreover, some goods/experiences may be necessary components of welfare, yet fall 
short of providing reliable (or even approximate) indicators of welfare (e.g. think of 
oxygen availability). This, in turn, constrains neuro-psychological indexes’ potential to 
inform the evaluation of policies’ welfare implications even under the assumption that 
these indexes reliably track necessary components of welfare. For example, consider 
Loewenstein and Ubel’s claim that “evaluations of welfare will inevitably have to be 
informed by a combination of [choice-based and neuro-psychological indexes] patched 
together in a fashion that depends on the specific context” (2008, 1795). This claim does 
not provide any informative insights regarding policies’ welfare implications unless one 
supplements it with more detailed indications regarding what indexes are considered, how 
these indexes are ‘patched together’ and how ‘the specific context’ determines the 
normative/axiological significance of the goods/experiences tracked by such indexes. 
 
A proponent of TU may object that neuro-psychological indexes enable researchers to 
evaluate policies’ welfare implications by categorizing individuals into distinct 
behavioural/neuro-psychological types (e.g. Kable and Levy, 2015, for statistically 
significant correlations between individuals’ risk propensities and morphometric 
indicators such as gray matter volume). Even so, it remains unclear how exactly these 
categorizations are supposed to inform researchers’ evaluations of policies’ welfare 
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implications. For showing that a policy is welfare-enhancing for specific 
behavioural/neuro-psychological types of individuals requires researchers to establish 
systematic correspondences between these behavioural/neuro-psychological types and 
the policy’s welfare implications for individuals of those types. And a given policy may 
have dissimilar welfare implications for individuals of the same behavioural/neuro-
psychological types (e.g. XXX). Therefore, researchers’ hypothesized ability to 
categorize individuals into distinct behavioural/neuro-psychological types falls short of 
indicating that they can accurately evaluate policies’ welfare implications for individuals 
of these types. 
 
A proponent of TU may further object that neuro-psychological indexes enable 
researchers to resolve disagreements concerning policies’ welfare implications without 
having to make normative/axiological assumptions (e.g. Bernheim and Rangel, 2009, 85, 
for the claim that neuro-psychological indexes can “in principle [resolve] any serious 
disagreement” as to whether specific policies enhance individuals’ welfare). Still, 
justifiably inferring that policies which enhance the value of specific neuro-psychological 
indexes also enhance individuals’ welfare requires researchers to specify how such 
indexes map on the notion of welfare. In fact, even this specification does not per se 
enable researchers to establish “what good policies follow” from neuro-psychological 
indexes (Camerer, 2008, 416). For demonstrating that a particular policy is justified 
requires one to show not just that this policy enhances individuals’ welfare, but also that 
such policy does not involve morally unacceptable violations of normatively significant 
values such as autonomy or consent (e.g. Hausman, 2012). In this respect, it is telling that 
distinct proponents of TU disagree regarding what policies (if any) are supported by the 






The critique put forward in this paper points to two major reasons to think that the search 
for the Holy Grail of ‘true utility’ should be abandoned. First, severe conceptual, 
epistemic and evidential problems plague ongoing attempts to develop accurate and 
reliable neuro-psychological measures of utility. And second, even if these problems are 
solved, neuro-psychological measures of utility lack the potential to inform welfare 
analyses and policy evaluations. These two reasons do not prevent researchers from 
identifying systematic correspondences between individuals’ choices and psycho-
physical magnitudes amenable to neuro-psychological measurements. Yet, if the present 
critique is correct, such correspondences provide neither ‘a neurobiological foundation 
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